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The problem with root cause analysis 
 
Introduction 
Attempts to learn from high-risk industries such as aviation and nuclear power have been a prominent 
feature of the patient safety movement since the late 1990s. One noteworthy practice adopted from 
such industries, endorsed by healthcare systems worldwide for the investigation of serious incidents, 
(1-3) is root cause analysis (RCA). Broadly understood as a method of structured risk identification 
and management in the aftermath of adverse events, (1) RCA is not a single technique. Rather, it 
describes a range of approaches and tools drawn from fields including human factors and safety 
science (4,5) that are used to establish how and why an incident occurred in an attempt to identify 
how it, and similar problems, might be prevented from happening again.(6)  In this article, we propose 
that RCA does have potential value in healthcare, but it has been widely applied without sufficient 
attention paid to what makes it work in its contexts of origin, and without adequate customisation for 
the specifics of healthcare. (7,8) As a result, its potential has remained under-realised (7) and the 
phenomenon of organisational forgetting (9) remains widespread (Box 1). Here, we identify eight 
challenges facing the utilisation of RCA in healthcare and offer some proposals on how to improve 
learning from incidents. 
1. The unhealthy quest for “the” root cause 
The first problem with RCA is its name. By implying - even inadvertently - that a single root cause 
(or a small number of causes) can be found, the term “root cause analysis” promotes a flawed 
reductionist view. (10)  Incident investigation in the aftermath of an adverse event is intended to 
identify the latent and active factors contributing to the genesis of a particular adverse event, (4)  but 
too often results in a simple linear narrative that displaces more complex, and potentially fruitful, 
accounts of multiple and interacting contributions to how events really unfold. (7,10-12) This is a 
tendency exacerbated by use of some RCA techniques (such as timelines or the “five whys”) that tend 
to favour a temporal narrative rather than a wider systems view.  
2. Questionable quality of RCA investigations 
Once an adverse event is classified as meeting the definition of a serious incident, an RCA is 
supposed to involve the convening of a skilled multi-disciplinary investigation team, preferably with 
representations from risk management personnel and clinical teams.(13) Over a pre-defined 
timeframe, which is mandated in some countries (60 days in the UK, 45 days in the US) (3,14), this 
team collects and analyses data and formulates an action plan.(13) However, challenges pertaining to 
the quality of this process abound. The task facing the investigation team is far from straightforward: 
the events underlying an incident have to be reconstructed from many different sources of varying 
degrees of reliability, usefulness and accessibility, ranging from hospital records, staff interviews and 
statements, to records of workforce rotas. (15) The information obtained directly from healthcare 
workers is influenced by their willingness and ability to provide relevant data (16,17) and by nature of 
the relationships and conversations between investigators and other stakeholders. (18) The 
involvement of patients and families affected by the incident is wildly variable, with only limited 
evidence-based guidance on how it can best be done (19). Yet, despite the complexities, sensitivities 
and challenges of this work, RCAs in healthcare are typically conducted by local teams, not the expert 
accident investigators who are proficient in systems thinking and human factors, cognitive 
interviewing, staff engagement and data analysis that are characteristic of other high-risk industries 
(20-22) Further, inconsistent use is made of the various investigative tools that are available. (15,23) 
As a result, exemplary practice in the analysis of healthcare incidents is rare. (24,25) 
3. Political hijack 
Constrained by strict timelines, and skewed by hindsight bias (26) and lack of independence from the 
organisation where the event took place, RCAs in healthcare often end up a compromise between 
“depth of data and accuracy of the investigation”. (16) The quest to complete an investigation on time 
and produce a report risks goal displacement, where the report is seen as the end product rather than 
the beginning of a learning cycle. Reports themselves, influenced by the need to preserve 
interpersonal relationships and by hierarchical tensions and partisan interests (8,16,27-29), may not 
always reflect the content of discussions during investigations nor the realities of what happened. 
(15,16)  Investigating teams may end their analysis once they have reached a cause of mutual 
convenience, perhaps one that edits out causes (and thus solutions) deemed to be beyond the remit or 
capacities of the organisation (16) and that occludes  deeper organisational and socio-political 
dynamics. (7,15,16) 
4. Poorly designed or implemented risk controls 
The key goal of RCA is to prevent similar events from recurring. (7,10,16) But few studies have 
investigated the nature and effectiveness of risk control strategies stemming from RCA investigations 
in healthcare. The available evidence points to the endemic tendency of investigators to settle for 
administrative and perhaps “weaker” solutions (such as reminders) rather than those that address the 
latent causes, such as poorly designed technology or defective operational systems. (8,16,30-32) 
Again, some of the reasons for this lie in the limited expertise of local investigation teams in selecting 
and designing appropriate risk controls (7,30,33). Only limited guidance is available (21,33-37) and 
what is available may not be sufficiently attentive to the specifics of the healthcare context. Yet 
poorly designed or ineffectual corrective actions may do harm. (31,32) Among other unintended 
consequences, risk migration, where attempts to mitigate a risk create new risks, may easily occur. 
(38,39) Recommended actions may also, of course, result in little change (7,30,40), especially (but not 
only) when senior managers are not involved in the generation of action plans and do not support their 
implementation. (41,42) Despite the time and effort invested in RCAs, (7,40,43) few incentives exist 
to follow-up formally on action plans:(8,44) estimates of implementation rates vary between 45 to 
70%. (31,45)  
5. Poorly functioning feedback loops  
For learning to occur, several conditions must be satisfied. Among the most important of these are the 
sharing of the outcomes of incident analysis with those involved, those who reported, and those likely 
to be affected in the future, especially in implementing recommendations. Evidence in other fields 
suggests that learning from events does not happen by itself (46): purposeful intent is needed both to 
disseminate the findings (47) and ensure that the recommended actions made salient and actionable. 
(46) Yet, as currently practised, feedback mechanisms in healthcare RCAs function poorly, 
contributing to the disenchantment of staff (48,49) and frustrating  the kind of double-loop learning 
(50) needed to secure change.  
6. Disaggregated analysis focused on single organisations and incidents 
The current RCA approach favours analysis of individual incidents in isolation and within bounded 
organisations.  The consequent tendency to generate localised action plans that are not shared more 
widely may result in failure to disseminate painfully-acquired learning and to address deeper, 
institutionally-engrained patient safety concerns. (21,51) Single incident analysis also frustrates the 
organisation’s ability to assess its vulnerability to recurring events (52). Organisations’ inability to 
effectively prioritise actions may lead to an unwarranted commitment of resources to averting specific 
very rare events rather than addressing the conditions that allowed the event to occur. Though 
mechanisms for aggregating learning from incidents and creating alerts do exist in some countries, 
their impact to date has been limited: similar events often recur in the same or similar organisations 
(Box 1), suggesting failure to learn both within and across organisations. (24)  
7. Confusion about blame  
Though healthcare is often exhorted to embrace a “no-blame” culture, the extent to which this 
urging is based on a correct understanding of what happens in other high risk industries is 
questionable.  (15,53) Investigators in other industries do not set out with a remit to assign 
blame, (20) but that does not mean that individual or organisational culpability is forever 
sequestered. The vast majority of mistakes and other errors are the result of systems defects 
that need to be corrected, but when blatant transgressions, neglect or unacceptable behaviour 
are found, it is clearly wrong to write accountability out of the picture. (54) Nor is “no 
blame”  the reality in practice, since disciplinary, institutional, and legal (civil and criminal) 
processes continue to operate and are highly visible to healthcare practitioners and managers, 
yet may appear arbitrary and unsatisfactory both to them and to patients and families.  A “just 
culture” is increasingly promoted in many organisations to balance the disparity between 
individual blame and organisational accountability. (55) This approach, however, comes with 
problems of its own when applied to incident investigation in healthcare. For instance, some 
of the more visible features of the “just culture” philosophy in incident investigation is the 
use of prescriptive algorithms and decision tools (such as culpability tree) to objectify 
culpability. Such “calculus-like logic” (56) may imply that actions committed by staff are 
binary (either acceptable or unacceptable) without appropriate appreciation of the messiness 
of the system in which the action occurred. (56,57)  
 
8. The problem of many hands 
RCA is further challenged by the problem of many hands, which describes the problem that many 
actors and their actions may contribute to an outcome, yet no individual is responsible either for that 
outcome or for fixing the problems that caused it. (58) This problem, which is endemic in healthcare, 
makes it difficult to address hazards that arise at the level of the system, since many of the actors that 
are implicated in hazards – including, for example, drug and equipment suppliers – are outside the 
direct control of individual care organisations. RCA investigations may fail to assign responsibility to 
such actors, instead re-absorbing responsibility into the organisation where the incident occurred. 
These organisations typically lack the legal mandate, resources and structural authority necessary to 
make the changes required.  
Discussion 
RCA is a promising approach with considerable face validity as a way of producing learning from 
things that have gone wrong. But it has consistently failed to deliver benefits on the scale or quality 
needed. The eight problems we have discussed here mean that, too often, RCA results in the 
tombstone effect: though its purpose is to guard against a similar incident in the future, it may instead 
function primarily as a procedural ritual, leaving behind a memorial that does little more than allow a 
claim that something has been done. (59,60) Incident investigation clearly will continue to play an 
important role in making healthcare safer, but it must first get better at doing what it does.  
The first step in securing improvement is likely to involve the professionalization of incident 
investigation: those conducting it need specialist expertise in underlying theories, ergonomics, human 
factors and hands-on experience of analytical methods. (20) For these reasons, the establishment of 
professional investigatory bodies, such as the one shortly to be launched in the UK, are welcome – 
though the scope, reach and impact of such bodies will need careful monitoring.  Second, the role of 
patients and relatives in the investigative process needs to be recognised and valued. Such 
engagement has the potential to generate a unique perspective of the service provided from the end-
user’s perspective and may foster dialogue that is informative to both causal analysis and design of 
risk controls. (61) The psychological and emotional readiness of patients and families involved in the 
investigative process needs to be considered, along with the maturity and ability of the organisation to 
facilitate such a process within the appropriate legal framework. Transparency on the agreed level of 
involvement is paramount from the start and the outcomes of investigations should be available to 
patients and relatives, though clarity on how this should best be done is not yet available (19). Third, 
better understanding of the role of blame is needed. The dissonance caused by claims of no-blame or 
even “just culture” and the reality is a source of confusion and distress in relation to RCAs. To 
address current confusions, clarity is needed on the distribution of responsibility between bodies 
investigating incidents (whose prime mandate would be to promote learning) and other bodies 
(including professional regulators and the law courts), and in what instances the investigative body 
needs to make referrals. (22)   
Fourth, healthcare must focus increasingly on aggregated analysis of incidents. (31,32,45,62,63) Such 
a bird’s eye view of incidents may facilitate prioritisation of interventions, based not just on the harm 
associated with incidents but also on the associated risks. Aggregated analyses can be performed at 
numerous levels of the organisational hierarchy e.g. the micro (within one department) and at the 
meso level (organisational). (41) At the national level, aggregated analyses offer a way of identifying 
common themes across similar and apparently more disparate incidents (31,32,45) and may also serve 
as a means of generating actions that require collaborative efforts between healthcare organisations or 
indeed between industry and healthcare. Such an example could be for instance product redesigning – 
a solution that may not be identified through the analysis of a single incident within one department 
but may reveal itself as a recurring theme when analysing multiple incidents across many 
organisations.  Linked to this, healthcare urgently needs to develop and evaluate much better methods 
for designing risk controls and other improvement actions. One possibility that could be evaluated, for 
example, is that of a hierarchy of risk controls. (33,34,36,37,64).  More broadly, the use of active 
surveillance of issues that have already been detected and monitoring of effectiveness of risk controls 
need to become a routine part of the risk management process following RCAs. Healthcare also needs 
to markedly improve its capacity to evaluate, curate and share these risk controls. Such an approach 
would help to address the problem that organisations tend to constantly reinvent risk controls, 
resulting in waste and the creation of new risks.(58)  An easily accessible database with descriptions 
of risk controls and contexts would enable lessons learnt from one RCA to be shared widely and 
support a participatory approach (65) to organisational learning.   
Finally, healthcare needs to do more to detect hazards and assess risks proactively. Root cause 
analysis is essentially retrospective, and depends crucially on an incident being recognised as such, 
but that may not happen for a variety of reasons: healthcare personnel may have become habituated to 
particular practices or outcomes, or fear and other negative emotions discourage reporting. Though 
RCAs were imported from other high-risk industries, the other tools and techniques commonly used 
in those industries to assess systems and assure their safety before an incident has occurred  - such as 
failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), hierarchical task analysis, and so on – have had far less 
attention in healthcare(66) FMEA, in particular, may be especially useful for the rigorous proactive 
risk assessment of a select few but high-priority hazards. (67) For healthcare truly to become a 
learning system, action is needed on multiple levels. RCAs have dominated for too long as the 
principal means of generating learning. The time has come to recognise both their opportunities and 
their limits. 
 
Box 1: Lessons not learned  
This example provides a summary of a real case that occurred in a hospital and the failure to learn 
from the incident in spite of a root cause analysis. 
In a large acute hospital, a patient underwent a routine cataract surgery – an operation with a 
minimal risk profile –led by an experienced ophthalmologist. The wrong lens was inserted during the 
operation. The error was promptly recognised post-operatively; the patient was returned to the 
operating room and the procedure was safely re-done.  
A subsequent root cause analysis identified that two lenses were in the operating room, one (the 
wrong one) brought in by an operating department assistant and the other by the surgeon. The 
investigation report identified that having more than one lens in the operating room and a failure in 
the double-checking process had caused the incident. The action plan included the development of a 
new protocol emphasising the individual responsibility of the surgeon to select the appropriate lens, a 
training program, improved documentation and a poster emphasising the importance of double 
checks.  
One year later, in the same hospital, a different patient with a different surgeon had the same 
procedure. Once again, the wrong lens was implanted. This time, the staff member who chose the 
wrong lens was the surgeon. 
 
 Root cause analysis (RCA) is a promising incident investigation technique borrowed from 
other high risk industries, but has failed to live up to its potential in healthcare. 
 A key problem with RCA is its name, which implies a singular, linear cause. 
 Other problems include the questionable quality of many RCAs, their susceptibility to 
political hijack, their tendency to produce poor risk controls, poorly functioning feedback 
loops, failure to aggregate learning across incidents, and confusion about blame and 
responsibility.   
 Implementation and evaluation of risk controls to eliminate or minimize identified hazards 
need to become a more visible feature of the RCA process. 
 To maximise learning, lessons learnt from incidents, descriptions of implemented risk 
controls and their effectiveness need to be shared within and across organisations. 
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